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Abstract 
I synthesize some of the lessons we have learned about systemic school 
reform in order and derive two explicit hypotheses about when such 
reforms are likely to be more and less successful.  The first hypothesis 
focuses on program implementation: to achieve success, any systemic 
reform must overcome challenges at each stage of the policy-making 
process, from agenda-setting to policy choice to implementation.  The 
second hypothesis focuses on the federated nature of education policy-
making in the United States: any successful systemic reform must offer a 
program that aligns local efforts with state and sometimes federal policy.  
I derive and test more specific hypotheses related to recent systemic 
reform efforts in the Los Angeles region—especially the Los Angeles 
Annenberg Metropolitan Project, or LAAMP—which ran from 1995 
through 2001.  The case confirms the hypotheses and enables a clearer 
understanding of systemic school reform. 
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 Over the last twenty years the most intense efforts at reforming public education 
have been focused on large urban districts.  As reform efforts continued, it became 
popular to speak of reforms as systemic, designed to alter the whole of a school district 
rather than only a few schools or classrooms. 
 In political and policy terms, “systemic reform” often equated to establishing a 
large civic coalition—business, labor, elected officials, community organizations—all 
backing a reform plan that was partly financed by philanthropists or foundations.  In 
Paul Hill’s words, reformers agreed that “it takes a city” to carry out effective systemic 
school reform (Hill, 2000).  This pattern of local coalitions of big-city school reformers 
could be seen from New York to San Diego, from Seattle to Miami, each developing 
specific initiatives for their own city’s school systems. 
 It is fair to say that none of these reforms have had the systemic effects they 
intended.  Despite two decades of creative and intensive work, urban education in the 
United States today is substantially similar to urban education in the United States in 
1983, before the publication of A Nation at Risk (National Commission on Excellence in 
Education, 1983).  After several waves of systemic reform, urban public school systems 
are organized and function in substantially similar ways and produce substantially similar 
outcomes.  The challenge for policy analysts is to make sense of all this, to explain the 
fate of such reforms. 
 This article seeks to advance the development of such an explanation.  In it, I 
synthesize some of the lessons we have learned about systemic school reform and derive 
two explicit hypotheses about when such reforms are likely to be more and less 
successful.  The first hypothesis focuses on the consistently vexing problem of program 
implementation: to achieve success, any program of systemic reform must overcome 
challenges at each stage of the policy-making process—agenda setting, policy choice, and 
implementation—in order to bring consequential action in offices and classrooms 
throughout a district.  Each of these stages involves a distinct set of constituencies 
working in distinct political arenas, and a reform program’s success in one arena carries 
no promise of success in any other.  This is especially difficult in a separation of powers 
system, where policy making and policy implementation are required to be conducted by 
separate institutions. 
 The second hypothesis focuses on the federated nature of the American political 
system: any successful systemic reform must offer a program that aligns local efforts 
with state and sometimes federal policy.  Despite the long history of local control in 
education policy making, in recent years state governments have come to play an 
increasingly decisive role, and national policy makers show signs of expanding their reach 
as well.  The interplay among levels of government common in all other policy domains 
is increasingly visible in education policy making. 
 I apply this analysis by developing hypotheses that can be tested on the case of 
recent systemic reform efforts in the Los Angeles region.  In particular, I explore the 
local Annenberg project—the Los Angeles Annenberg Metropolitan Project, or LAAMP 
—which ran from 1995 through 2001.  As we would predict from this analysis, the 
politically successful LAAMP civic coalition ran into common problems bringing their 
program into schools and classrooms.  As we would further expect from this analysis, 
the major provisions of the LAAMP program of systemic reform worked best when they 
aligned with statewide California policy initiatives, and ran into significant barriers when 
they ran at cross-purposes with state policy.  After considering the Los Angeles case in 
some detail, I close with a brief consideration of the policy and research consequences of 
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this synthesis for our understanding of LAAMP in particular and the broader politics of 
systemic urban public school reform in the United States. 
 
I.  Making Sense of School Reform Politics 
 
The Implementation Problem 
 Everyone involved with public education has come to recognize that urban 
public school reform can be fragmented and chaotic, as the political fortunes of 
competing proposals and reformers wax and wane in various segments of the system (for 
example, Elmore and McLaughlin, 1988; Cuban, 1990; Hess, 1999; Cibulka and Boyd, 
2003).   At its worst, reform can become merely improvisational, with no clear focus or 
purpose (Kerchner and Menefee-Libey, 2003).  Even when coherent, however, school 
reforms are rarely implemented smoothly and thoroughly.  They are usually delayed and 
modified in the process, as they mesh with organizations and previous reforms already in 
place (Tyack and Cuban, 1995). 
 This is certainly not unique to educational policy making.  Charles Lindblom 
observed decades ago that even in cohesive policy domains, policy making is usually 
done by trial and error (Lindblom, 1959).  Anthony Downs showed that shifting 
coalitions and a fickle public made for incoherent environmental policy making, for 
example, even as the Environmental Protection Agency was being created (Downs, 
1972).  If we think of successful policy as progressing from agenda setting, to legislation 
or mandates, to implementation, scholars agree that this process almost always brings 
vexing political challenges.  The problem of implementation is nearly universal (Goggin 
et al, 1990; Peters, 1999). 
 Yet elementary and secondary education policy presents an unusually difficult 
case.  It is a huge and disaggregated sector, with more than 15,000 diverse school 
districts in 50 states cumulatively educating more than 50 million children, spending 
hundreds of billions of dollars, employing millions of teachers and other staff, and 
responsible for a wild array of policies (Wirt et al, 2003).  Only the health care sector in 
the United States approaches education in its Byzantine complexity. 
 Policy analysts often describe implementation as the tail end of a linear process, 
which can be depicted schematically as in Figure 1.  This conveyor-belt sequence is a 
simplification; every aspect of this process is always occurring simultaneously in the 
education sector, just as it is in every policy domain (Stone, 2002).  Nevertheless, the 
schematic helps to reveal a powerful conundrum about policy making in general, and 
education policy in particular: there is a logic to the fragmentation.  Each stage of the 
policy process involves a distinct set of political players.  To take the examples shown in 
Figure 1, the Los Angeles civic leaders who in 1994 embraced the national Annenberg 
Challenge and initiated the Los Angeles Annenberg Metropolitan Project or LAAMP 
were powerful agenda setters.  But the members of LAAMP’s board played only a 
limited role in 1995-1996 writing the particular memoranda of understanding (MOUs) 
between LAAMP and the various school districts that chose to take part in the program, 
and it was those MOUs that were in effect the enacted policy of systemic reform for 
several groups of schools in the Los Angeles region.  And the lawyers and policy 
specialists who negotiated those MOUs, in turn, did not go into classrooms around the 
region to teach new material to schoolchildren for the next five years. 
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 Agenda setting and 
identification of 
alternatives Æ 
Policy choice: 
legislation or 
mandates Æ 
 
Implementation 
Example: Los Angeles civic leaders 
negotiate agreement with 
Annenberg Foundation to 
launch LAAMP as a local 
affiliate of the national 
Annenberg Challenge  
(1994-1995). 
LAAMP enters into 
memoranda of 
understanding 
(MOUs) with several 
school districts in 
Los Angeles region 
to change policies on 
teacher training and 
instructional practice 
(1995-1996). 
Teachers in 
participating schools 
teach children with 
curricula that mesh 
across grade levels 
and schools (1996-
2000). 
Figure 1. Education policy as a linear process?  Examples from the 1990s in Los 
Angeles 
 
 In education policy as in almost every other policy domain in the United States, 
initiatives are contested at each step of the way, in each distinct political arena, among 
the many people and groups that have a stake in the performance and quality of 
government activity.  Education presents an especially vexing example of this fraught 
process because the development of K-12 education policy involves an unusually broad 
and diverse array of political participants, ranging from parents, students, teachers and 
citizens in local communities up to federal officials and even candidates for President of 
the United States (Wirt and Kirst, 2001).  Each stage of the policy process offers distinct 
advantages and challenges to the various kinds of participants.  For example, while civic 
leaders may have substantial agenda setting power, they may have little influence over 
actual lawmaking.  Likewise, while lawmakers write the policy, they play no role in 
implementing reform at the school or classroom level.  Further, few of these participants 
have strong incentives to cooperate with each other.  Even if they did, in a separation of 
powers system they might not have the capacity to cooperate effectively in developing and 
carrying out reforms.  Thus, the implementation conundrum for school reform, and 
especially for systemic reform: we would predict that to achieve success, any program of 
systemic reform must overcome challenges at each stage of the policy-making process 
and bring consequential action in offices and classrooms throughout a district. 
 
A Federated System 
 
 Let us further complicate the analysis.  Although many urban systemic reform 
initiatives have focused on a particular city or school district, elementary and secondary 
education is increasingly governed at the state level.  Locally-focused systemic reform 
makes sense from an historical perspective, given that local control has been “the 
hallmark of American education” since the beginnings of public schooling in the 1820s 
(Kirst, 1995 p. 29).  Systemic reformers have focused on local strategies because that’s 
where the power has always been. 
 But as Michael Kirst has demonstrated, states began assuming increasing 
authority over a variety of school policies in the 1960s and 1970s, and the pace of their 
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growing power has only increased in recent years.  States now administer categorical 
grants (their own and those of the federal government), they oversee and often equalize 
school finance, they prescribe curriculum, they train most and certify all public school 
teachers, they provide services to specific populations like the handicapped, and the list 
goes on and on.  Finally, much of the national debate about K-12 schools and school 
reform in this new century has focused on testing and accountability, a policy issue 
increasingly controlled at the state level. 
 What does this state activity mean for urban school reform?  Simply put, it 
demonstrates that we must rethink the notion of systemic reform, commonly offered as 
a promising strategy for school improvement.  The federated system of school 
governance means that systemic reform must work effectively not only with the various 
components of an urban school district, but also with state policy.  To borrow another 
common school reform term, any urban reform initiative not well “aligned” with state 
policy—no matter how well tailored to the particulars of the local situation—is doomed 
to failure.  A city’s reformers must either devise a systemic reform program consistent 
with state policy, or they must convince state policy makers to change state law in ways 
that will advance the local reform. 
 To return to the schematic notion of Figure 1, we can add a second dimension to 
the chart that represents the various levels of school governance.  In its most complex 
form, this second dimension might include levels for the national government, the state, 
the district, the school and the classroom.  For simplicity’s sake, let’s just include the 
national and state governments, districts and schools in Figure 2.  This helps to clarify 
the example from Figure 1, while for example the LAAMP program focused on Los 
Angeles area districts and schools, its development and implementation was shaped by 
national and particularly state politics and policy. 
This clarifies a second conundrum.  Just as the various participants in the policy 
process often lack good reasons or capacities to cooperate in implementation, so too the 
participants at the various levels of school government may lack reasons or capacities to 
collaborate in making and implementing educational programs and policy.  Clinton-era 
struggles between the federal government and state legislatures over Goals 2000 
curriculum frameworks illustrate this conundrum well.  The interests and values that 
various state legislatures pursue while making educational policy may bear little 
resemblance to the interests and values of the U.S. Congress or the White House.  
Similarly, local political actors and dynamics in urban area school systems may be quite 
different from those in state capitols or Washington, DC.  Nevertheless, federal and 
particularly state policy makers have the authority to demand that districts and schools 
comply with their rules and demands.  Thus, the federated nature of the American 
political system drives a second hypothesis about systemic reform: any successful 
systemic reform must offer a program that aligns local efforts with state and perhaps 
federal policy. 
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Agenda setting 
and identification 
of alternatives Æ 
Policy choice: 
legislation or 
mandates Æ 
Implementation 
National 
government 
 
Presidential election 
campaigns, 
executive-
Congressional 
negotiations 
Title I of ESEA; 
Goals 2000; 
subsidizing 100,000 
new teachers; Obey-
Porter grant 
program 
U.S. Dept of 
Education 
grantmaking, 
oversight 
State government 
 
Gubernatorial 
election campaigns, 
executive-legislative 
negotiations 
Three different 
testing regimes; 
STAR accountability 
requirements; 
teacher recruitment 
and training; Class 
Size Reduction 
Allocation of money 
to school districts 
and schools; 
oversight of 
categorical 
programs 
School districts 
 
LAAMP civic 
coalition in Los 
Angeles region 
LAAMP reform 
codified in several 
districts: families of 
schools, each with a 
distinct plan for 
improvement 
Budgeting, teacher 
allocation, oversight 
and monitoring 
Schools 
 
Parent involvement 
in writing Site 
Action Plans 
Limited 
participation in 
shaping details of 
LAAMP program 
Principals and 
teachers carry out 
LAAMP program 
and plans 
Figure 2. Adding a Simplified Second Dimension, with examples from the 1990s 
 
  
Applying This Analysis to the Los Angeles Case 
 
 Let us turn to a consideration of the LAAMP program in Los Angeles to see 
whether this analysis helps our understanding of the case.  Take each of the established 
hypotheses in turn.   
 
 The Implementation Challenge.  First, we expect that in a complex and 
fragmented policy making system, any program of systemic reform must overcome the 
challenges of moving from policy idea to mandate to actual implementation. 
 There can be no doubt that K-12 public education in Los Angeles is complex and 
fragmented.  At the time civic leaders were forming the Los Angeles Annenberg 
Metropolitan Project in 1994 and 1995, the Los Angeles Unified School District 
(LAUSD) alone enrolled more than 635,000 students and had an annual budget of more 
than $4.5 billion (Menefee-Libey & Mokyr, 2003).  Though LAUSD was only one of 83 
districts in Los Angeles County, it comprised nearly half of the county’s K-12 public 
education system.  The sprawling 650 square mile district encompassed all or part of two 
dozen different cities, and employed more than 50,000 teachers and staff.  It had a large, 
professionalized and hierarchical structure that had evolved over decades of repeated 
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reorganization and reform.  Los Angeles school politics had also evolved into a world 
unto itself, separated from city politics and dominated by a contentious relationship 
between the district and a powerful teacher’s union, United Teachers of Los Angeles or 
UTLA (Menefee-Libey et al, 1997).  Any observer could reasonably predict that any initiative 
promising systemic reform of LAUSD, let alone schools in several districts across Los Angeles County, 
would struggle at every stage of the policy process, from agenda setting to enactment to implementation. 
 
 The Federated System.  The challenges of carrying out a local systemic reform 
while coordinating education policy among the various levels of government are also 
powerful in the Los Angeles case.  Indeed, by the mid-1990s California was unusually far 
along the path toward state-level dominance of elementary and secondary education 
policy.  Nearly 60% of all public school spending in California came from the state’s 
general fund (EdSource 1998, 23).  Twenty-three percent more came from property tax 
revenues, which have been controlled by state law since the passage of Proposition 13 in 
1978.  Inequalities among district expenditures throughout the state are governed by 
Serrano vs. Priest, a California lawsuit that produced a state court equalization decree in 
1976. 
 The state controls more than just the level of funding for each district in 
California.  Increasingly since the 1980s, the state controls what districts and schools 
spend their money on.  “General purpose” funds, over which school districts have 
substantial control, have declined from 83.4% of K-12 spending in 1990-1991 to less 
than 70% in recent years (Legislative Analyst’s Office 2002, p. E-76).  Allocations of 
these general purpose funds are often beyond the easy control of school boards and 
administrators, as a substantial proportion of them is spent on salaries and benefits, most 
of which are negotiated through collective bargaining mandated by the state.  Generally, 
about 65% of a district’s operating budget is mediated by its labor contracts.  Non-
general purpose funds that remain must be spent by districts on specific “categorical” 
programs, notably special education, class size reduction, child care and development, 
instructional programs targeted at racial and ethnic minority students, adult education, 
and so on.  This is in addition to the 8-10% of overall funds that come from the federal 
government, virtually all of which is categorically encumbered (EdSource, 1998 and 
2002).  At the end of the day, the autonomy of local districts in managing their own 
affairs—to say nothing about their ability to achieve systemic reform—was sharply 
constrained by the time LAAMP began its work. 
 This growth in state control continued throughout the period under investigation 
here.  California’s governors ushered in dramatic school reform initiatives: among other 
things, Pete Wilson (1991-1998) embraced the Stanford-9 standardized test, literacy 
programs, and Class Size Reduction, and Gray Davis (1999-2003) secured passage of the 
Academic Performance Index (API), a high school exit exam, teacher development 
programs, and a set of reading initiatives (Kirst, Hayward and Fuller, 2000).  Indeed, 
even when the economic slowdown and a decline in tax revenues forced California 
governments at all levels to scale back, both major party candidates in the 2002 campaign 
for governor proposed ambitious K-12 reforms, and Arnold Schwarzenegger in his 2003 
gubernatorial recall campaign proposed no reductions in school spending.  A similar 
pattern has played out in the state legislatures.  During the 2001-2002 term, for example, 
the California Senate and Assembly education committees reported out 196 bills, of 
which 90 were passed into law (California Assembly Education Committee, 2002).  Thus, 
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we can hypothesize that California is perhaps the ultimate setting in which any urban systemic reform 
initiative must coordinate with state policy in order to survive. 
 
 In the remainder of this article, I test these hypotheses about the challenges of 
implementation and federalism by applying them to the case of the Los Angeles 
Annenberg Metropolitan Project’s program of systemic reform during the period from 
1995 through 2001.  The broader description of the Los Angeles region’s school reform 
politics and policy is drawn from archival and field research conducted by the author 
since 1993, including personal interviews with personnel from LEARN and LAAMP, 
administrators at the school district office and school sites, school board members, 
teachers and their union, as well as members of the broader community.  Findings from 
that research have been reported in Menefee-Libey et al. (1997), Shipps and Menefee-
Libey (1997), Bryk et al (1998), Kerchner and Menefee-Libey (2003), and Menefee-Libey 
and Mokyr (2003). 
 The description of LAAMP operations contained in this article is based on 
personal observation, individual interviews, focus groups and the collection and analysis 
of documents conducted as part of a broader ongoing research program by Charles 
Kerchner, David Menefee-Libey, DeLacey Ganley, Jason Abbott and Stephanie Clayton.  
Members of the research team interviewed most of the LAAMP board’s executive 
committee members, some of the board’s other active members, and superintendents 
from virtually all LAAMP-participating school districts.  Focus groups were held with 
LAAMP staff, and selected interviews were held with educational leaders outside of 
LAAMP itself.  All together, approximately 50 interviews were held, each lasting between 
45 minutes and 3 hours.  Respondents were assured of anonymity.  This research 
program produced two previous reports: Kerchner, Abbott, Ganley and Menefee-Libey 
(2000), and Ganley, Kerchner, Menefee-Libey and Abbott (2001).  It was affiliated with 
the Los Angeles Compact on Evaluation (LACE), an Annenberg-sponsored collaborative 
based at the University of Southern California and the University of California at Los 
Angeles.  This article draws on LACE reports as noted.  As of August 2004, information 
about LAAMP and many of the organization’s important documents were still available 
online at http://www.laamp.org. 
    
II. Systemic Reform in Los Angeles 
 
 In early 1994, shortly after Ambassador Walter Annenberg announced his plans 
to give $500 million to public education, Annenberg's friend and advisor, Vartan 
Gregorian, called University of Southern California (USC) president Steven Sample to 
ask if Los Angeles would be interested in participating in the Annenberg Challenge.  
Gregorian was assured that Los Angeles would indeed be interested, and the effort to 
form what became the Los Angeles Annenberg Metropolitan Project began.  Although 
LAAMP was a new organization, it joined an ongoing stream of reform efforts that 
shaped the Annenberg Challenge while, in turn, being shaped by it. 
 Current approaches to school reform began to develop in California and Los 
Angeles in the early 1980s, just as the publication of A Nation at Risk, the federal 
government's attention-grabbing report that is considered the origin of the current 
school reform era, gained national attention (National Commission on Excellence in 
Education, 1983).  In California that same year, Superintendent of Public Instruction Bill 
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Honig pushed successfully for legislative passage of the Hughes-Hart Educational 
Reform Act, popularly known as SB 813, which mandated sweeping reforms of 
curriculum and assessment as well as increased parental involvement in schools.  Less 
than two years later, a group of business and civic leaders formed the Los Angeles 
Educational Partnership (LAEP), a nonprofit organization that helped to develop 
innovative curriculum and provide assistance for teachers and schools in LAUSD. 
Reform proposals in Los Angeles shifted to systemic approaches in the late 
1980s, first in 1989 when after a two-week strike the United Teachers of Los Angeles 
(UTLA) settled a labor contract with LAUSD that mandated a shift toward site-based 
management (SBM) of the district's schools and budget.  (A time-line of political and 
organizational events is shown in Figure 3.)  Pressure came from a markedly different 
direction a year later with the launch of Kids 1st, a community-based effort pressing for 
safer and better schools.  Kids 1st included several grassroots organizations, all with ties 
to the Industrial Areas Foundation: United Neighborhood Organizing Committee of 
East Los Angeles (UNO), South Central Organizing Committee (SCOC), East Valleys 
Organization (EVO) and the San Fernando Valley Organized in Community Efforts 
(VOICE).  It was chaired by businessman Richard Riordan and UTLA president Helen 
Bernstein.  The group commanded attention by mobilizing 3,000 people to join a “safe 
schools” rally in July 1990.  It commanded even more attention when it mobilized 15,000 
for a similarly themed rally the following October. 
In early 1993, less than a year before the national launch of the Annenberg 
Challenge, many of these Los Angeles efforts came together to produce Los Angeles 
Educational Alliance for Restructuring Now (LEARN), the reform effort that provides 
the most important context for LAAMP. 
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Figure 3.  A Time-Line of Important Educational Reform Developments in Los Angeles and California, 1989-2001 
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From LEARN to LAAMP in Los Angeles: Forming the Civic Coalition and Setting 
the Agenda 
 
 In March 1993, after two years of political organizing, program development, public 
outreach, and government lobbying, LEARN gained an endorsement of its sweeping school 
reform proposals from the board of LAUSD.  LEARN's program of decentralized decision 
making and broad collaboration among principals, teachers, parents, and other 
"stakeholders" promised to remake the district and refocus LAUSD schools on student 
achievement.  LEARN planned to start small in September, with fewer than three dozen 
participating schools, and then expand to encompass all of the more than 650 schools in the 
district within five years.  In its reports of the board’s endorsement of the plan, the Los 
Angeles Times reported that “School board member Mark Slavkin said the plan will serve as 
‘a new constitution for this school system.’”  Member Jeff Horton expressed the view that a 
program with such public support was bound for success: “We nave never seen such broad 
participation in a school reform movement in the history of this district.”  (Banks and 
Chavez 1993)  In fact, this ambitious systemic program would take four years to reach more 
than half the district’s schools and it foundered on central office and school-level resistance, 
but LEARN’s civic coalition did command broad support during its first two years of the 
program’s implementation. 
During LEARN's early stages, Ambassador Walter Annenberg announced his plan 
to give $500 million to improve America's public kindergarten through high school (K-12) 
system.  Annenberg's December 1993 announcement initially was received with 
ambivalence in Los Angeles, where LEARN and a variety of other reforms were already 
well established politically.  People wondered whether the city needed an additional reform 
program, particularly one from out of town.  Still, Gregorian, then the president of Brown 
University, articulated an Annenberg Challenge vision of a public-private collaboration that 
was consistent with the city's recent history of educational reform.  In addition, Theodore 
Sizer's ideas about school autonomy fit well with broadly accepted ideas about reform in 
Los Angeles.  Sizer was head of the Annenberg Institute and founder of the Coalition of 
Essential Schools.  The Annenberg Challenge also carried advantages not lost on local 
reformers: linkages to a visible national network and, of course, badly needed fiscal 
resources.  Unfortunately, like LEARN, the LAAMP program commanded little legislative 
or financial support from state policy makers in Sacramento. 
The Annenberg Challenge sparked enough interest among educational reformers in 
Los Angeles that several local civic leaders, including some LEARN "Working Group" 
members, began the work needed to bring the Annenberg Challenge to Los Angeles.  
Although this group was initially led by USC's Steven Sample, he quickly handed leadership 
to Virgil Roberts, an attorney and longstanding school reform activist.  Roberts had 
previously worked with LAEP and LEARN.  As his first main task, Roberts helped 
assemble an initial board of directors who could write and submit a proposal for a new 
school reform initiative in Los Angeles (LAAMP 1994).  In December 1994, the Annenberg 
Foundation rewarded this group's efforts when it announced that it was allocating $53 
million to support LAAMP. 
From early 1994 Roberts and his colleagues worked to develop the LAAMP 
organization and its program.  The two tasks were deeply intertwined; they developed a 
broader civic coalition capable of developing and sustaining a program of systemic reform.  
As the leaders pulled together LAAMP's board of directors and filled top staff positions, 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 12 No. 60  12
several of their decisions had important consequences for the program, its public 
viability, and its effectiveness in schools. 
Three pivotal decisions about the scope of LAAMP—each taken at the strong 
urging of Sizer and Gregorian at the Annenberg Foundation but with active agreement 
from the reform players in Los Angeles—stand out as especially important.  First, the initial 
leaders agreed to form a new school reform organization in Los Angeles instead of making 
LAAMP a project of an existing organization or group.  Affiliating with local universities 
was an available option, particularly because several of the early organizers of the LAAMP 
effort came from local institutions of higher education, namely USC and the University of 
California, Los Angeles (UCLA).  The most obvious preexisting organization with which 
LAAMP could have teamed was LEARN.  As noted earlier, LEARN already had established 
a community base and a working board of directors; it had successfully campaigned to gain 
broad endorsements of its reform program from foundations and institutions; and it was 
the official reform effort of LAUSD, complete with the support of the school board.  A 
relationship with LEARN was obviously important to LAAMP, for LAAMP’s first major 
financial decision was to contribute nearly $5 million to help fund LEARN's training 
program for the 1995–1996 school year.  But the Annenberg Foundation and LAAMP's 
leaders had a vision that in many ways extended beyond the scope of LEARN, so they 
declined to simply merge the two projects.  For example, LAAMP would take a more 
prescriptive approach than LEARN when it came to using standardized testing and other 
assessments as performance indicators for schools, the professional development of 
teachers, and collaboration with other reform participants beyond a single school, among 
other things.  As one of our respondents noted: 
“The LEARN reform . . . was not going in that direction, didn’t have its 
roots there.  Its roots were more in ‘We’re going to structure [school-level] 
leadership so that they can have power over budgets.’  And that’s really, in practice, 
where they were headed—that, and teachers shall have decision-making.  And that 
was a very, very powerful strategy in practice.  The [LAAAMP] proposal to the 
Annenberg Foundation, while it includes this, is very very rich in the action 
principles for reform, which include authentic assessment, which include peer and 
collegial support for each other, collaboration. 
The leaders of LAAMP clearly saw their approach as being unique in Los Angeles, and 
wanted to build an organization around this approach.  Their decision to create a new 
organization gave LAAMP the advantages of relative autonomy and a fresh start, but it also 
substantially delayed implementation of the LAAMP plan because the new organization had 
to spend the time to develop its own board, staff, and program. 
In a related decision, LAAMP's early leaders agreed with the Annenberg Foundation 
that LAAMP would be a metropolitan project.  That is, it would invite participation not only 
from within LAUSD (which itself spans several cities in addition to Los Angeles), but also 
from other school districts in Los Angeles County.  This metropolitan approach to school 
reform was unusual for Los Angeles and, indeed, for any region in the United States.  It is 
much more common to have school policy concentrated at the district and state level; rarely 
do reform efforts attempt to work across districts.  Doing so, however, made sense to 
LAAMP’s coalition of civic leaders because increasing numbers of suburban school districts 
all over the country face traditionally urban problems, such as poverty, low achievement, 
high student transience and attrition, overcrowding, and loss of coherence.  An interview 
respondent told us: 
“There was a core of the people who’d been involved with LEARN but then 
there were also many people who hadn’t been who came on and, you know, made a 
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very high-powered, prestigious group with a reform mandate that was county- or 
region-wide.  Now LEARN was only, only L.A. Unified School District so, you 
know, [LAAMP’s] mandate was broader.” 
The new project’s leadership agreed that the problems of urban schooling spanned far 
beyond L.A. city limits.  More specifically, the leaders of suburban districts in the Los 
Angeles region saw that they continued to share many traditionally “urban” challenges, 
particularly those associated with great diversity, high proportions of immigrants, and many 
limited or low proficiency English-speaking students.  Furthermore, by working with a 
reform effort that spans the Los Angeles metropolitan area, districts might gain 
opportunities to learn from each other’s ideas and experiences.  If successful, LAAMP's 
metropolitan focus might have important regional and national implications. 
Paradoxically, despite this embrace of challenges beyond the Los Angeles Unified 
School District, LAAMP’s leaders failed to incorporate in their plans any work with policy 
makers in Sacramento, the state capital.  They recognized that state policy would influence 
their systemic reform efforts, but they made no plans to seek state support or even 
accommodation of their program.  As noted below, this would have substantial implications 
for the ongoing evolution of the LAAMP program and its implementation. 
A third organizing decision made early on had equally powerful consequences.  
LAAMP's leaders decided to exclude representatives from the local educational 
establishment—namely, teacher unions and school district administrators, especially from 
Los Angeles Unified.  Looking back, one focus group participant explained it this way: 
“The decision was made at the start in the initial discussion, and initial press 
about it that the school districts, and in this case L.A. Unified, would not be 
included in the planning process and would not have license to be invited into the 
room to consider the future of education in the metropolitan region.  We can debate 
that, but I think that was a key turning point in establishing the tone and a 
relationship with the school district that LAAMP has lived with for better or for 
worse from the very start.” 
This marked a sharp departure from the two most important reform initiatives in LAUSD’s 
recent history: the site-based management program begun in 1989 and, more notably, the 
newly established LEARN project, which relied heavily on the participation of high-level 
union leaders and public school administrators.  Instead of involving those actors in its civic 
coalition and in the agenda-setting stages of its work, LAAMP would instead engage them 
at the later stage of policy enactment and implementation. 
The LAAMP board cemented its decision to be an exclusive organization when it 
chose Maria Casillas over Helen Bernstein as LAAMP's executive director.  Bernstein, 
former president of the UTLA, had been on the forefront of school reform efforts in Los 
Angeles and had shown great ability by leading UTLA to embrace LEARN.  Her reputation 
as an aggressive unionist  concerned some members of the LAAMP board, which wanted to 
dissociate its program from teacher unions and the baggage that came with them.  Others 
were concerned about Bernstein’s close association with former LEARN leader and now 
Mayor Richard Riordan, worried that LAAMP would be dominated by Riordan and his 
allies for their own purposes.  When Riordan proposed Bernstein as the leader of the 
project, he met immediate resistance.  A LAAMP insider told us: 
“I think it was a disservice to Helen that they tried to shove her down the 
throats of everybody because if they had not tried to do that, people wouldn’t have . 
. . said, ‘Wait a minute.’  So you know, but it wasn’t that she was a unionist. . . . 
That’s not why people were saying ‘No.  Not Helen.’  It was, ‘Why Helen and who 
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decided it was Helen and why are we going through a [selection] process if you 
already decided it was Helen?” 
Alternatively, Casillas had strengths of her own as a candidate for leadership of the project.  
Although a former LAUSD teacher and administrator who had served on LEARN's original 
community board, she had left the district and spent two years as an administrator in El 
Paso, Texas.  By hiring Casillas as executive director of LAAMP, the board signaled that, 
while LAAMP would include leaders who were sophisticated about what it would take to 
fully implement a systemic reform program, it would not be a creature of the Los Angeles 
Unified or Los Angeles city establishments. 
LAAMP's board had ties to a broad range of communities in this diverse region.  
Although they did include several leaders from the existing network of school reform 
activists, they were successful in reaching beyond it.  Many board members worked hard 
and effectively to secure the local financial support the Annenberg Challenge required to 
match its initial $53 million gift, and create the $103 million pool of resources dedicated to 
the project.  Board members also served as public agenda-setters for LAAMP, explaining 
how the program's work could help improve the region's schools.  But their targeted 
audience was the Los Angeles region’s public opinion and school establishments, and they 
did not focus much attention on the state capitol in Sacramento, where dramatic policy 
initiatives were under way that would both shape and constrain LAAMP’s efforts at 
systemic reform. 
 
Developments in California Education Policy 
 
Throughout the time LAAMP’s civic leaders were developing and carrying out their 
program of systemic reform, policy makers in Sacramento continued to press their own 
school reform agenda.  As this article’s driving hypotheses would predict, these state 
initiatives proved pivotal to many, if not most, of LAAMP’s activities.  Four sets of state 
policies proved especially important: testing requirements for students and schools; class 
size reduction; teacher recruitment, training and retention programs; and a broad literacy 
initiative.   
At the time LAAMP began in 1995, California had no statewide assessment scheme.  
The previous program, the California Learning Assessment System (CLAS) had collapsed in 
political controversy in 1994 (Kirst et al, 1995, chapter 2), and each district was allowed to 
pick its own assessment tool.  Well after LAAMP’s work was under way, Governor Pete 
Wilson and the legislature reestablished a statewide program in 1997, the Standardized 
Testing And Reporting (STAR) program, built around the Stanford-9 test.  Governor Gray 
Davis subsequently convinced the legislature to dramatically increase the impact of that test 
in 1999 with the Academic Performance Index (API) system of publishing summary and 
ranked test scores for every school and district in the state.  Further, a high-stakes state 
graduation exam is scheduled to take effect with the class of 2006. 
Of equal importance, by the middle of 1995 the California economy had begun to 
recover from a prolonged recession and was well on its way to a sustained boom.  As 
LAAMP started its operations, public schools in Los Angeles and throughout the state were 
still suffering from the effects of the early 1990s recession.  A combination of tax limitation 
measures and rapid enrollment growth starting in the 1980s dropped per pupil funding for 
schools from approximately the national average per student to more than $1,200 below the 
national average by 1995. 
LAAMP's programs began just as the mid-1990s economic recovery started 
generating increased tax revenues for the state.  By the mid 1990s, Governor Pete Wilson 
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and the legislature — prodded by the Proposition 98 mandate to spend a constant 
proportion of growing state tax revenues on elementary and secondary education — were 
ready to spend more money on schools.  But instead of sending the increases 
unencumbered to districts and schools, state policy makers chose to allocate the money 
through categorical programs.  Most notable was the Class Size Reduction program begun 
in 1996, a program costing more than $1 billion per year which offered increased funding to 
school districts if they reduced kindergarten through third grade enrollments to 20 or fewer 
per classroom (Wexler et al 1998).  The program—and its funding—was expanded in 1999 
to cover certain high school English and mathematics courses, but the impact on school 
districts was no less confining. 
A third major state educational initiative came in 1998, when the state legislature 
mandated new teacher preparation, induction and retention programs be created at the state 
and district levels (EdSource 2003).  This was particularly necessary because of the large 
numbers of new teaching positions created by the Class Size Reduction law.  It was 
particularly important to poor urban districts like LAUSD, which were already suffering 
from shortages of qualified teachers.  Those districts were particularly hard hit by Class Size 
Reduction, because that program created opportunities for large numbers of experienced 
teachers to migrate out of the urban districts to more affluent districts and their easier 
working conditions. 
Finally, a fierce controversy arose in 1998 over language instruction in California, 
particularly over existing bilingual education programs.  Most public attention focused on 
the debate over Proposition 227, a ballot initiative mandating a dramatic reorientation of 
language instruction toward immediately teaching English to non-English speakers.  The 
following year, the legislature followed the lead of newly elected Governor Gray Davis in 
creating an intensive new literacy program—targeted at both English speakers and non-
English speakers—as a substantial categorical grant to school districts. 
 Most of these policy initiatives could be reconciled with systemic reform in Los 
Angeles, but all state-level factors worked to LAAMP's benefit.  Throughout the course of 
the organization's life, Los Angeles and California were repeatedly divided by controversial 
ballot initiatives concerning schools.  The stage was set in 1993 by Proposition 174, which 
proposed a voucher scheme that would have severely disrupted the funding of public 
education.  (It failed.)  The turmoil continued in 1994 with Proposition 187, a successful 
effort to deny a variety of publicly funded services—including education—to illegal 
immigrants and their children.  Although its educational provisions were later voided in 
court, the initiative dominated public discussions about schooling just as LAAMP was 
launched. 
 
Families of Schools: Policy Choice and the Enactment of the LAAMP Program 
 
 Throughout the twists and turns of its organizational development and the turmoil 
of state politics, LAAMP remained accountable to the Annenberg Foundation under the 
terms of the proposal it had submitted in November of 1994.  That proposal blended the 
expressed commitments of the Annenberg Challenge with school reform ideas that had 
already gained broad support in Los Angeles.  The core idea of the proposal was to reach 
beyond individual schools to establish and assist school "families," each constituted by a 
high school and the middle and elementary schools from which it primarily drew its 
students (Wohlstetter et al., 2003).  The notion of focusing assistance on families rather than 
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individual schools was encouraged by Gregorian, and it captured an unrealized ideal of 
the LEARN reforms.  
With LAAMP's assistance, principals and teachers and parents within these families 
would collaborate to develop coherent curriculum and instruction that would be integrated 
from kindergarten through high school graduation.  All efforts were to support LAAMP’s 
“Seven Principles” (LAAMP 1994): 
1. Strive to become stable learning communities where students are known so well 
that they can be helped academically and socially no matter what their primary 
language. 
2. Exercise productive local control over resources and decision-making. 
3. Create a broad, intellectually challenging curriculum to which every student has 
access. 
4. Value inclusiveness among parents and stakeholders in school decisions and 
activities. 
5. Provide purposeful professional development as an incentive to help build a 
stable learning community. 
6. Allocate time in schools and Families of Schools in ways that enable teachers to 
get together and talk about what they are teaching and how they are teaching. 
7. Engage in regular internal and public assessments and discussions of student and 
school performance, giving the school and the public the opportunity to 
understand and support the school's basic mission to increase student 
achievement. 
LAAMP participants would also work with parents to guide each child up through the 
“family” system from elementary through high school. 
 Implementation of such a complex program in such a complex setting was bound to 
be difficult, and was bound to change the shape of the program as it went along.  LAAMP 
encountered difficulties almost immediately, both from the Annenberg Foundation and 
from the schools they hoped to assist in the Los Angeles region. 
 The Annenberg Foundation grew uncomfortable as LAAMP began to develop its 
implementation plans during the spring and summer of 1995.  Gregorian insisted that each 
city's Annenberg Challenge program around the country would have a coherent theory of 
action – a specific program of school reform intended to improve student achievement.  
The various programs could then be evaluated and compared at the end of the five-year 
Challenge.  But LAAMP, working to further develop an approach that had begun under 
SBM and LEARN, proposed instead to let each school family propose its own program of 
school improvement, or "family learning plan."  LAAMP would encourage each school 
family to write a plan that identified a core program of improvement, and LAAMP would 
then assist them in "broadening and deepening" that program and its impact.  The 
evaluation would then focus on the effectiveness of LAAMP's assistance and on student 
achievement in the schools, rather than on some specific LAAMP-wide program of school 
improvement.  A LAAMP insider put it this way in an interview: 
“The decision the board made was that we weren’t going to prescribe to people how 
they did it.  What we were going to say is that any school district that was engaged in 
reform, a reform that embodies our Seven Principles, we would consider supporting 
them in deepening and broadening their reform.  And that was a fundamental 
decision by the board because we had an option of maybe saying, ‘This is what we 
want,’ like in New York. . . . almost saying ‘this is what we think reform ought to be 
and everybody that’s prepared to do this, apply to us and we will fund it.’  Or we 
could say, ‘We’re not going to tell you how to do reform.  You tell us what you’re 
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doing and if it matches what we think will work, we’ll fund it and we will take a 
look at it and we’ll see what works.  Sort of the difference between having a cookie 
cutter plan and sort of throwing it out at I guess a market approach and saying, 
‘Who can do the best reform?’” 
The Foundation was never completely comfortable with this bottom-up approach, but by 
the end of 1995 it was willing to accept it.  The dispute helped to delay implementation of 
LAAMP's program for more than a year, however. 
 Relationships were also sometimes tense between LAAMP and some of the schools 
they hoped to assist.  LAAMP’s leaders made it clear that any school hoping to receive 
LAAMP support and assistance must have a specific plan of action up front, and apply for 
admission to the program on the basis of that plan.  The organization’s leaders spent much 
of 1995 hammering out a Memorandum of Understanding with Los Angeles Unified about 
how LAAMP would work in that district, confirming that in LAUSD only LEARN schools 
—each of which already had some form of Site Action Plan—would participate in LAAMP.  
There was some disagreement about whether LAAMP would simply provide funding for 
ongoing LEARN activities, or whether LAAMP would require each LEARN school to 
modify their reform efforts to join a “family” network of LAAMP schools.  As the year 
progressed, LAAMP began to draw criticism from the Los Angeles Times, the Annenberg 
Foundation and others about their delay in paying out money and implementing the 
program in the broader metropolitan region.  (Colvin and Pyle 1995)  Some of this criticism 
originated with suburban school district leaders who had their own contacts within the 
Foundation. LAAMP responded in December 1995 by soliciting proposals from families of 
schools throughout Los Angeles County. 
 Many school districts had some difficulty with this process, illustrating the 
challenges that arise when systemic reform moves from elite planning to detailed policy 
choices and implementation.  The LAAMP board decided against offering planning grants 
to schools to help them develop their proposals, fearing that such grants would further 
delay the applications and siphon off money from the assistance program itself.  A focus 
group participant explained: 
 “Our board decided there would be no planning grants.  In other words, in 
every [participating] school district, every school that could get others to join it and 
form a family, became eligible in the county [outside of LAUSD].  In L.A. Unified, if 
you had a family of LEARN schools formed, you automatically became eligible for 
these funds. . . . But we were concerned that if we gave the money away without 
proposals of some kind . . . it was problematic.” 
Many leaders in those districts were under the impression that LAAMP was offering a first-
come, first-served assistance program, and they rushed to compile and submit proposals by 
the March 1996 deadline.  The LAAMP staff soon communicated to several districts, 
however, that first-come would not necessarily mean first-served: the quality of their 
proposals was insufficient to warrant their participation in the program.  Only 12 school 
families – many involving LEARN schools in LAUSD – gained approval by the end of the 
1995-96 academic year.  Two more were added shortly afterward, to round out the group of 
14 "Cycle 1" families.  These misunderstandings gradually got worked out, and LAAMP 
eventually selected 28 families – 7 more designated Cycle 2 and the final 7 designated Cycle 
3, with all the families totaling 247 schools – for the program by the end of the 1996-1997 
academic year. 
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Implementing the Evolving LAAMP Program   
 
The LAAMP program began to take a clearer form once the initial school families 
were identified and the LAAMP staff began working on learning plan development and 
actual implementation in the fall of 1996.  Although the organization remained committed 
to a broad program of reform described as The Seven Principles (the language of which 
continually shifted in subtle ways), it became clear that school families could not realistically 
work effectively on all seven principles simultaneously.  Each of the families had generally 
done substantial work pulling themselves together into a more or less coherent group in 
order to write their initial proposals.  After acceptance into LAAMP, they continued to 
develop their proposals into workable family learning plans with the assistance of LAAMP 
staff.  The time and energy needed for planning and development mandated that equal 
attention and care could not be given to each of the principles. 
Even before the details of each family learning plan were set, all school families had 
by the end of 1997 embraced a clear commitment to public engagement and reporting.  At 
the urging of the LAAMP board, they agreed that all participating schools needed to 
communicate with their communities about what they are working on, and what kinds of 
problems and progress they were encountering.  By early 1999, this commitment was 
integrated into what LAAMP came to identify as Data Driven School Reform (DDSR).  
That is, school families regularly collected data on multiple indicators of school and student 
performance to refine and improve their learning plans and implementation, and they 
regularly reported their findings to the broader community, including an annual report with 
specific reports on test scores and other indicators of outcomes.  This was a new idea at 
many of the LAAMP schools, as one insider told us in an interview: 
“Once we fully understood how we could leverage . . . the annual report, 
there was an ‘Ah-ha’ at the schools, then all of a sudden they’re looking at student 
data, and that was the hardest thing.  Schools would focus on process data, you 
know, like ‘We met ten times, and dah dah dah” because that’s what they were used 
to out of Title I.  And we were saying, ‘No no no, we want to see the student data.  
We want to see an increase in the student data, and how is your professional 
development linked to it.’  And then, all of a sudden, we started going out and we’d 
go to the school family governance meetings and they’re talking like this.” 
The influence of state policy on the development of Data Driven School Reform 
cannot be overstated.  Prior to the 1996 enactment of Standardized Testing and Reporting 
(STAR) and the 1999 creation of Academic Performance Indexes (API), schools and 
districts usually resisted publishing test score data, and such data played only a limited role 
in shaping curriculum and instruction.  (See Figure 3 for chronology.)  Despite LAAMP’s 
1995 initial commitment to “Create, use, and publicize ongoing assessments of student and 
school performance in order to create accountability at the school, the Family of Schools, 
and district levels” (LAAMP 1995), it is extremely unlikely that they could have achieved 
this goal unless the publication of such data were required by the state. 
A second common commitment was to a literacy program, embraced by 23 LAAMP 
school families.  Responding both to Governor Gray Davis’ statewide literacy initiative and 
to perceived needs within their own schools, the schools worked to assure that all their 
students could read by the end of the third grade, and that they continued to develop their 
reading and writing skills across the curriculum. 
In addition, several school families were funded to deepen their efforts toward one 
or more of LAAMP’s three strategic initiatives: parent involvement, teacher training, or 
technology.  One group of school families chose to focus its attention on involving parents 
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in the day-to-day activities of schools.  These schools work with a variety of LAAMP-
related groups including PLP, a Weingart Foundation funded program, and the Parent 
Institute for Quality Education.   
A second group of four families has focused on the professional development of 
teachers.  They became identified as "DELTA Families" and worked closely with the 
emerging DELTA Collaborative between LAAMP and teacher training programs at 
California State University's various campuses.  The urgency of this work was clearly 
spurred on by the state’s 1997 creation and 1999 expansion of Class Size Reduction 
program, which brought an influx of emergency-credentialed teachers into Los Angeles 
schools, without the level of training and preparation expected from previous generations 
of teachers (Griffin, 1999). 
A third group of six school families targeted the role of technology in student 
learning, and worked under LAAMP's collaboration with the Los Angeles County Office of 
Education's Technology for Learning program.  These programs began rather late in the life 
cycle of LAAMP and received LAAMP funding for only two years, ending in 2000.  Yet 
they carried out substantial work training teachers in the use of instructional technology and 
in integrate that technology into their teaching and curriculum (Friedman et al, 2000). 
By the middle of 1997, LAAMP as an organization had homed in on two driving 
commitments.  One was that LAAMP should focus on student results: families and schools 
moving toward curriculum, instruction and professional development that demonstrably 
improved individual student achievement according to standardized tests and other 
measures.  This assessment and accountability agenda was cemented in place by the 
LAAMP board’s commitment to outreach and public "reporting." As articulated in one of 
the organization's quarterly reports, the board agreed that there "is a continuing need to 
restore confidence in public education by identifying reform measures that are taking hold," 
and they wanted to "deepen commitment to the role of holding public education 
accountable to the public for improving student achievement" (LAAMP, 1997).  Thus all 
LAAMP family schools would be involved with public reporting at all levels, from making 
information available to parents and community members at individual schools to 
sponsoring glitzy high-profile annual "reporting events."  This was consistent with 
LAAMP’s longer term aspirations to leave a “legacy” of systemic change in performance 
and expectations of local schools even after the five-year program had ended. 
LAAMP’s first annual reporting event, held at the Burbank Airport Hilton in 
November 1997, set the pattern for future events.  Stakeholders created presentations that 
reviewed learning plans, budgets, survey results, and other indicators.  The day-long event 
included overview presentations on the Annenberg Challenge and LAAMP, but it also 
included specific presentations by each participating school family.  Teachers, parents, 
community members, and even some students made presentations on their experiences with 
LAAMP.  They were encouraged to explain the difference that implementing school family 
learning plans were making in student achievement and to support their presentations with 
data.  The final LAAMP reporting event in October of 2000 continued in this pattern 
(LAAMP, 2000).  Each school family presented extensive information and data as the 
project neared completion. 
Such public events, although not necessarily as upscale as the annual reporting 
events, are part of a new dynamic in Los Angeles school reform, reinforced by state 
mandates to report test scores.  Stakeholders nevertheless remain ambivalent about such 
events.  On one hand, the events raise the visibility of school reform before the media and 
the general public, and they help to improve the public conversation about schools.  They 
provide real information about schools rather than the standard fare of rumors and 
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stereotypes.  One crucial purpose of LAAMP was to help prepare school leaders for that 
level of exposure, which was something new.  As a LAAMP insider reported to us in an 
interview, 
“You go back to the real basic stuff, first of all.  I think a lot of these folks 
that are out there, cluster leaders and principals and others, are real bureaucrats.  I 
mean, they don’t want to accept that they are, but they are.  They are driven by the 
pink memorandum and the yellow memorandum and the culture of ‘Do the right 
thing for whomever is evaluating you.’  And because student performance is at such 
low levels and because you know have the technology that can just make it more 
public, in an accountability system like that, you know today it’s in the [news]paper.  
And it’s their school compared to schools like yours.  You can’t shelter yourself 
from that information.  What we have is the ability to come in from the outside as 
partners.  And we’re not evaluating them.  We are simply trying to inspire them, 
provide them with good information to help them do their job.” 
 
That is a genuine challenge, because school family participants reported spending a 
tremendous amount of time and energy on preparing for the events, which in and of 
themselves did little to improve their schools and in some ways created school-level 
resistance to the ongoing implementation of the program.  The public dynamics of the 
events — with their pressure to find and deliver short-term good news — may in some 
ways have undercut the purposes of data-driven reform, which is a slow process of trial and 
error.  Reporting results became so charged that these public events faced the danger of 
becoming more important than the ability of schools to learn from the data.   
 
The Aftermath: Transition and Scale-up  
 
By the start of the 1998–1999 school year, all LAAMP families were up and running 
and the organization had established a relatively stable program.  The Los Angeles 
Annenberg Metropolitan Project had, albeit with a number of delays and with several 
modifications of its initial expectations, successfully navigated the process from agenda 
setting to policy formation to program implementation.  Their program of systemic reform 
would be completely in place for two full years before the Annenberg Foundation’s $53 
million and a similar sum from local grants and contracts would run its five-year course. 
The board and staff in 1998 began to turn their attention to two related issues.  The 
most immediate concern was with continuity.  LAAMP was chartered as a five-year 
program, and needed to turn its attention to continuing the programs beyond 2001.  
LAAMP achieved several successes in this regard.  It transferred the Preparing Tomorrow’s 
Teachers to use Technology (PTTT) program, a multiyear project funded in 1999 by a $1.48 
million grant from the U.S. Department of Education, to the private Los Angeles 
Educational Partnership (LAEP).  LAAMP also fostered the formation of new 
organizations and the continuation of others. The LAAMP board supported, and financed 
with a $1 million grant, the creation of the Los Angeles County Alliance for Student 
Achievement, a civic leadership organization that drew participants and staff from the 
former LEARN and LAAMP projects, though that organization dwindled within two years.  
LAAMP board and staff members were also instrumental in founding Families in Schools, a 
non-profit organization to continue and strengthen parent involvement.  Finally, LAAMP 
transferred control of the DELTA program initiative has been transferred to LAEP, after it 
had been strengthened with additional grants. 
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These continuities nevertheless revealed that the apparent success of LAAMP’s 
design and implementation were less than systemic.  LAAMP’s family network approach to 
school improvement required a substantial investment of outside resources and assistance 
into each school family’s development and implementation of a plan tailored to their 
particular needs.  Indeed, many of these plans benefited from collaboration with other 
school families, even across school district lines.  Yet their survival required ongoing grants 
and support from various government and philanthropic organizations, support that by its 
very nature will never be provided systemwide.  To put the LAAMP program in 
perspective, the $103 million raised and spent by the program in its five years is nearly 
trivial in Los Angeles County, where more than $13 billion is spent each year on K-12 
education.  LAAMP’s resources were targeted for maximum leverage, and the project never 
ran out of cash, but the requirements for continuity are daunting. 
This raises the second concern of the LAAMP staff in 1998 as they began to look in 
a more focused way at the future: they worried about the problem of scale, or "scaling up" 
in educational jargon.  How could the lessons learned through LAAMP be shared beyond 
the LAAMP families to influence the broader development of school reform throughout 
the Los Angeles metropolitan region?  The Annenberg model was to create concentrated 
and visible programs of innovation and improvement in selected cities and regions, in order 
to provoke broader emulation and improvement across the country, or at least across the 
metropolitan areas where the programs were carried out.  But the extensive (and expensive) 
organizing and programmatic work required for even the twenty-eight LAAMP school 
families proved daunting.  Even if the program had gained widespread attention and 
admiration in the Los Angeles region – and there is no evidence that it did – the LEARN 
experience suggested that scaling up would run the risk of diluting LAAMP's efforts and 
reducing the effectiveness of its program. 
This challenge was complicated further by the indeterminate impact of the LAAMP 
project.  Researchers including the present author gathered and analyzed extensive data 
throughout the five-year program and found mixed results.  On one hand, LAAMP as an 
organization was found to have a substantial impact on the public debate over school 
quality and reform in the region.  The project strengthened and continued the civic coalition 
that supports public school reform in the Los Angeles region; it started school families, a 
powerful and potentially lasting innovation in how school districts are organized; and it 
helped focus attention on student outcomes as the legitimate measure of reform (Kerchner, 
Abbott, Ganley & Menefee-Libey, 2001).  In-depth research into the workings of school 
families also revealed a powerful tool for bringing coherence and effectiveness to teaching 
and learning (Wohlstetter, Smith, Stuart & Griffin, 1999).  Researchers were, however, 
unable to detect a significant impact on student achievement during LAAMP’s brief period 
of full implementation (Baker & Herman, 2002). 
 
III. Conclusions and Implications 
 
 What conclusions can we draw about systemic reform from this case?  In the 
simplest terms, the LAAMP case confirms the hypotheses developed earlier in this article.  
First, LAAMP’s experienced and politically sophisticated civic coalition leaders were able to 
master the challenges of shepherding their reform through agenda setting to program 
enactment and policy implementation.  Their relative success is completely consistent with 
research on policy design and implementation in general.  In particular, they had sufficient 
organizational capacity and resources to create meaningful incentives for stakeholders to 
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join in (Goggin et al, 1990).  They also blended clear and explicit top-down principles and 
mandates with a flexible process of bottom-up design and implementation (Elmore 1982). 
 By their own standards, however, the work of LAAMP’s civic coalition leaders fell 
short.  Their expressed intention was not simply to create an effective program for 28 
families of schools.  They proposed systemic reform, a program which would create a ripple 
effect throughout the public education system in the Los Angeles region, from the school 
boards down into the classrooms.  They intended that other schools and districts emulate 
their actions and embrace their decentralized approach to school change and improved 
student achievement.  This is the very definition of systemic reform.  They also intended 
that their program would become self-sustaining, that schools and school districts would 
continue the family-based practices of school improvement initiated by LAAMP and 
assisted by public and private sector organizations.  Though many of the particular 
initiatives and programs of LAAMP continue, the systemic aspirations so visible at the 
beginning are now gone. 
 This case also confirms the second hypothesis presented at the outset: that systemic 
reform must be aligned with state policy in order to survive and succeed.   LAAMP proved 
adept at adapting to many state initiatives: Standardized Testing And Reporting (1996) and 
its successor, the Academic Performance Index (1999), Class Size Reduction (1996 and 
1999), teacher recruitment and professional development programs (1998 and 1999), 
Governor Davis’ statewide literacy programs (1999).  Indeed, LAAMP’s development of 
Data Driven Reform built on and extended statewide testing and reporting programs in 
ways that lawmakers in Sacramento could only have hoped for.  In many cases, adapting to 
state mandates also meant that families of schools could use state categorical money to 
reinforce their own local initiatives. 
 Still, one of the centerpieces of LAAMP – school families – will in the longer term 
suffer from being completely ignored by state policy makers.  LAAMP created a potentially 
powerful reform in school families.  It will take sustained support and development if they 
are to continue, however.  School families are a much more radical departure from 
conventional school bureaucracies than they appear on the surface.  Both in Los Angeles 
and in the surrounding school districts that created school families, the family structure 
created information pathways and coordination that was somewhat independent of the 
school hierarchy and that sometimes threatened it.  School families were not subdivisions of 
districts in which the leadership was given authority over the principals and teachers within.  
Instead, they resembled networks or collaboratives to which people attached themselves 
because they provided useful services, information, and support (Wohlstetter et al, 2003). 
 These networks will not be naturally self-sustaining.  They are threatened both by 
burnout and by bureaucratization.  Although the school superintendents we have 
interviewed tell us that they intend to keep and strengthen school families, these 
organizations require resources.  One of LAAMP's tactical lessons has been that funding a 
family coordinator position was nearly essential to creating a robust network of schools.  As 
the LAAMP program and the resources that accompanied it dwindle away, it would be 
surprising to see school families survive as a feature of school reform in the Los Angeles 
region. 
 Perhaps the best opportunity for school reformers in Southern California to gain 
policy support for school families and other networks of teachers and parents will come as 
the state's new high school exit examination—yet another sweeping state mandate—comes 
into full force.  All school districts have become acutely aware that student success on the 
high school exam requires that schools and educators connect across the traditional 
boundaries between elementary and secondary schools.  This connection was one of the 
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original LAAMP goals, and, as we have seen, LAAMP families encourage connections—
the sharing of teaching strategies and the communication of vital information about 
students. 
The example of school families illustrates the broader point that this case study 
confirms: the autonomy of local systemic reform efforts in American cities is an illusion.  
The state is now the most powerful policy agent in California’s K-12 education system, just 
as it is throughout most of the United States.  The various policy making systems of 
elementary and secondary education in the United States may be terribly complex in 
practice, but this theoretical point is relatively simple.  A local reform program cannot 
succeed without being aligned with state policy, or at least with the acquiescence of state 
policy makers. 
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